(May-June 2009 GroundSwell)
OIL AND GAS LEASING: A STUDY IN PSEUDO-SOCIALISM
By Dr. Mason Gaffney, Riverside, CA
I pose three
questions.
I) What is
Socialism?
II) What is
pseudo-Socialism?
III) How should we administer
public lands bearing oil and gas?
I. WHAT IS SOCIALISM?
"Socialism," in common
usage, is a Protean word, slippery and shifting. Many use it without defining
it, whether from innocence, negligence, or cunning. These many include
many economists: semantic care is weak in the traditions of the
profession. "Rigorous" model-builders today are among the offenders: the premium
is on gilding the lily, neglecting the roots. Indeed, roots are not even needed
for models that float in outer space, vouching for and communing mainly with
each other.
Those who do define
Socialism, explicitly or implicitly, use the word for different things. A major
difference, treated here, is between Managerial Socialism (who decides) and
Distributive Socialism (who gets). These may overlap, but are independent of
each other and often conflict. For example, Riverside, CA, owns its own electric
utility (on whose Board I once sat, fighting for a little justice and efficiency
against lobbyists and dupes). This is Managerial Socialism, municipal style. Its
traditional rate structure includes large elements of cross-subsidy, mainly
taking from the lower middles for the rich, tempered by crumbs thrown to the
very poor. The same is true of our water system, and of most municipally owned
and managed utilities around the nation. Water and sewer service are common
examples of Managerial Socialism (from which the mnemonic "sewer socialism").
They have little in common with Distributive Socialism, except when their rates
are held down by taxing benefited lands, common in dynamic cities of the
Progressive Era.
At higher levels of
government, also, Managerial Socialism may play reverse Robin Hood. In British
Columbia the "Socred" (right-wing) party in the 1960s socialized the ferry
service, the provincial railroad, and the electric utility (now B.C. Hydro),
using them in schemes to enrich land speculators. To boost along B.C. Hydro they
raided the teachers' pension fund, borrowing from it at rates near zero. The New
Democratic Party (NDP) (left-wing), taking power in 1972, ended the raid on
teachers, but not the cross-subsidy. In California, the State?s Department of
Water Resources (DWR) designed, built, and operates the California Water Plan
(CWP) for the primary gain of a handful of giant landowners on the west side of
the San Joaquin Valley. They, too, raided education, taking certain State oil
revenues (known as the COPHE fund) previously earmarked for The University of
California. Such examples could, of course, be extended at length.
Another form of Managerial
Socialism is direct administration of public lands. Our National Forests are an
example. The track record is not good. The Forest Service manages a national
asset worth several $100 billions, from which it generates no positive cash
flow. Latent surpluses die a-borning. At one time this was from an excess of
ideological commitment to slow cutting cycles and "community stability," as
exemplified by Congressman James Weaver's dedication to Roseburg, OR. More
recently it is from internalizing profits and plowing them into roading
submarginal forests for uneconomical cutting. Libertarians and allied (James)
Buchananites blame this on their universal demon, ?the bureaucrat?, expanding
her empire. They have dressed up this view, which is pretty much Rush Limbaugh
in drag, as a new ?discipline?, called ?public choice?, now crowding more useful
knowledge out of overpriced textbooks forced on the captive market of college
students. Self-preserving bureaucrats are a factor; but hiding up above and
pulling their strings are landowners in marginal counties containing federal
forest lands. These pull for ill-advised cutting because they get a piece of the
revenue to lower their local property taxes. Buchanan and public choice
disciples are silent on this, the key factor. Either way the Forest Service
soaks in revenues from the Federal Treasury, yielding nothing back. Even if one
likes the model, it could not be universalized.
More commonly, public
landlords lease lands to private firms, limiting their managerial input to
dirigisme expressed in regulations and guidelines. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) thus administers its vast empire, which includes the Outer-Continental
Shelf (OCS), as mainly a passive landlord. Its main task is just collecting
rents. To the extent The Bureau does a good job, or Congress lets it do a good
job, this evinces more of Distributive than Managerial Socialism. To the extent
it does a bad job it is "Pseudo-Socialism," to be discussed presently.
Distributive Socialism, in
contrast to Managerial, means tapping surpluses in the private sector and using
them for the public good. The revenues may provide public services that are
available to all, like schooling and social security; or be used to abate
regressive taxes; or be used to finance social dividends paid in cash, as in
Alaska. Revenues may also be used to finance public works, even though these
benefit only a few specific landowners. This becomes Distributive Socialism when
the enhanced land rents are tapped to recoup more than the allocated
expenditure. (If only expenditures are recouped, it is more like a contract
between the state and the landowners.)
Interjurisdictional
transfers are not properly "Socialism," but a reshuffling of rents among
landowners. These transfers are called "horizontal balancing" in the lingo of
fiscal federalism. They are a long step removed from the social dividend paid to
individuals as such. They are properly decried for "taxing poor people in rich
places to help rich people in poor places." These "poor places" include
developmental regions and local districts, poor today but prospectively rich,
where landholdings are large and speculative. Horizontal balancing devices thus
fall in a class of artful dodges, seductions, and diversions leading from
Distributive Socialism to Pseudo-Socialism.
Distributive Socialism also
means administering public lands pro-actively, affirmatively, to maximize
revenue, in the manner of private landlords. Not to do so is to let private
lessees keep and privatize the surpluses generated by resources in the public
domain. The NDP in B.C. earned its Socialist stripes by raising rents on Crown
lands owned by the Province ("The Crown Provincial," in Canadian terms). The
Minister of Lands did this directly by renegotiating timber and other leases, on
a site-specific basis. He could have huffed and bluffed less, and accomplished
more, but he did seem to have the basic concept.
The NDP Administration
tried to socialize the surpluses in gas extraction by joining Managerial and
Distributive Socialism in the B.C. Gas export monopoly, a Crown Corporation. It
was to levy a tax in the form of a monopoly profit on gas transmission and
export. Here they stumbled by failing to recognize the differential,
site-specific nature of rent. They made it too easy, thinking it was just a
matter of buying low and selling high, across the board. They set a uniform
field price. It was, naturally, too low not to stifle high-cost producers, and
yet too high to tap most of the rent taken by low-cost producers. They failed to
rifle in on the source of the surplus.
Thus, to define
Distributive Socialism we need to define "surpluses." These are primarily
rents from lands and resources given by nature. In an open tax jurisdiction,
labor and capital are mobile and their supply is elastic; only land is fixed.
Land rent is the basic taxable surplus. Where there is no land rent, an attempt
to levy any tax can only abort extraction and land use, rather than collect the
tax. Where is there no land rent? First, there is no rent generated on
"marginal" land that is just barely worth using at all. Second, and more
generally, there is no rent generated by marginal increments of labor and
capital applied on any land, from the best to the worst. Otherwise, all
production on land generates some rent, which is a taxable surplus.
The statement above
expresses "The Physiocratic Doctrine" of tax incidence, harking back to Francois
Quesnay, and even earlier writers like John Locke and Jacob Vanderlint and
perhaps Richard Cantillon. The Doctrine has staying power: it is used, for
example, by Bogart, Bradford, and Williams writing in the National Tax Journal,
December, 1992, on tax incidence in New Jersey.
Capital, unlike land,
migrates among taxing jurisdictions. The return to reproducible, depreciable
capital is not, therefore, generally a surplus. Capital differs from land.
Capital has to be attracted, and, if domestically generated, dissuaded from
emigrating. It is true that in the short run existing capital, if affixed to
land, cannot be exported. Its returns thereby become a temporary taxable surplus
- hence the name "quasi-rent." Capital can still be dissaved, however,
through neglect of maintenance, and will not be replaced. The demonstration
effect of disappointing old investors' earlier expectations will have a high
cost in repelling future investing by them and others. Old buildings,
unmaintained, will shed blight on their surroundings. Non-replacement, in a
dynamic world, guarantees early obsolescence. Capital finds many subtle ways of
emigrating, or being disinvested and consumed. Its yields are not really a
taxable surplus when we factor in the consequences of trying to tax them:
withering away of the community.
The Physiocratic rule,
which may seem novel and subtle in tax discourse, stands out nakedly whenever
landowners, public or private, negotiate leases. If a lessee is required to pay
a share of his gross sales (a royalty), he compensates by offering that much
less on the "bid variable," (often a "bonus" paid up front). Lessors and lessees
understand this well: it is central to all their negotiations. Whatever the
twists and turns, the rule of compensation applies: take more here, get less
there. The lessee is to supply labor and capital at full cost; acquiring use of
land will yield him a surplus above costs. That surplus is all he can and will
pay for. The maximum of economic surplus is the rent of land in its highest and
best legal use.
Distributive Socialism,
then, means tapping land and resource rents for the public. On the public
domain, acknowledged to be public property, the institutional basis of
Distributive Socialism is fully in place. We need only apply a good leasing
system, keeping rent payments up to current values. On fee simple lands,
Distributive Socialism means and requires modifying tax systems to rifle in on
rents.
Rifling in is essential. Recall, the Physiocratic rule of
compensation says all taxes are shifted to rents anyway; some take that to mean
any tax will do. However, "broad-based" taxes like VAT or a general sales tax
sterilize lands that would be just marginal before tax. They also abort all
marginal and near-marginal activity on all lands, for marginal inputs (where
marginal cost equals price) generate no rent. That in turn forces rates to
be kept low, to avoid destroying half the economy. Such taxes socialize all the
rent from lands that are now made marginal after-tax, but leave most rent
untapped on the most rentable lands and resources. Taxes that rifle in on rent,
on the other hand, inherently exempt marginal activity. They may be set at very
high rates, tapping more of the taxable surplus, or rent.
Analogously, recall the
case of the B.C. Gas Corporation cited earlier. This is a public agency set up
to extract rents from gas resources by monopolizing export, buying low and
selling high. Its fatal initial error was to set a uniform field price. This
price must remain fairly high to avoid stifling the high-cost (marginal)
producers. As a result the price is high above that needed for the low-cost
producers, leaving them enjoying the rent of the resource.
Let's look at a simple
numerical example, to make the point. Say the uniform field price is set at
$1/mcf, while costs of extraction range from 20 cents to $2 per mcf. All
producers with costs over $1 are wiped out; all those with costs under $1 are
left taking a surplus per unit of $1 less their respective costs. The example is
useful to understand how taxes work, too. The B.C. monopoly cut is just like a
tax levied on each unit of extraction.
Whether on public domain or
fee simple lands, Distributive Socialism has three compelling attractions. One
is, it requires no Managerial Socialism; it may work through the free market. It
does not preclude elements of Managerial Socialism, where these are otherwise
desirable; it simply does not require them.
The second attraction is
that it lets taxes be progressive without impairing incentives. Taxes that rifle
in on rents are progressive and distributively socialistic because the ownership
and control of rent-bearing lands is highly concentrated in a few hands. If you
wonder who?s in charge here, just start something.
The third attraction is
that taxes on rent may be heavy without impairing incentives, precisely because
rent is a surplus. The land-tax component of the existing property tax is a good
model. With this tax, there is no "taxable event" required. Taxes are simply due
periodically, based on an external assessment of the land's market value, which
in turn derives from rent of its highest and best prospective use.
Most political leaders live
and orate in a world of dismal choices and trade-offs. To them, there is no
cutting the deficits, either state or federal. We must cut taxes or lose jobs.
We must make taxes regressive or destroy useful incentives. On the other hand,
once we define, identify, and rifle in on rent as taxable surplus, those hard
choices vanish. We can have higher taxes and more jobs, both at once. We can tax
progressively while simultaneously enhancing incentives to produce and
save.
Likewise, on lands still in
the public domain, we can rifle in on rent by framing and administering a good
leasing policy. Leasing does have some transaction costs, but the private market
does it anyway. There is a reasonable, if less than perfect, track record.
Ground leases are common in downtown real estate, nationwide, even under
imposing structures like the Empire State Building, and Rockefeller Center. The
Irvine Company, holding 20% of Orange County, California, has long declined to
sell land, but only lets it for intermediate terms. Much of Hawaii is developed
on the same terms. Most oil and gas is developed by lessees on private land,
yielding large rents to the lessors.
Why cannot the U.S.
Government as lessor do what private lessors do, extracting the surplus for the
owner? Here we meet the obstacle of Pseudo-Socialism, to which we
turn.
II. WHAT IS PSEUDO-SOCIALISM?
Pseudo-Socialism is what
happens when resources in the public domain are leased below a market rental,
giving away part of the public interest. That has the effect of installing the
lessee as though she were the owner. The BLM, leasing grazing privileges on
Federal lands in the west, has fallen into this pattern conspicuously and
notoriously, subject to pressure from western Senators who have the power of
many votes in the U.S. Senate relative to their state populations. As the late
Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana said a century ago, a major problem in
Washington is not so much the free coinage of silver, as of western senators.
The dollar values in grazing are small, but the object lesson is visible,
depressing, and cautionary.
Some other bad examples are
school section lands in the middle states. These originated as Federal
land grants intended to support local schools. Some of them are corruptly let to
insiders in "sweetheart deals" for token rents. Another bad example is the
County of Los Angeles, which owns lands in the Marina del Rey district. One
parcel lay idle for 25 years in the control of a politically well-connected
developer who finally went bankrupt and walked away from it, leaving unpaid even
the token rent charged. A third bad example is ironic: Fairhope, AL, founded and
chartered specifically as a "single-tax colony," to exemplify the principles of
Henry George. The Fairhope Corporation owns the land and collects the ground
rent for public purposes. However, when a new generation arose "that knew not
Joseph" it proved politically impossible to keep colony ground rents up to
market. The same happened in Canberra, its original financing carefully planned
by transplanted Chicago Georgist Walter Burley Griffin.
Another aspect of
Pseudo-Socialism, practised by Reagan?s Interior Secretary James Watt, is to
offer for immediate sale, for spot cash, much more than the current market can
absorb. For example, in April, 1982, Interior leased out coal reserves in the
Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana. The sale comprised 1.6 billion tons,
at 3.5 cents/ton. Leases were for 50 years, with few development requirements.
The industry already had a 200 year supply under lease, with the result that few
bid, and they bid low. The winning bidders were a tiny number of huge
corporations, those with slack money to buy reserves for the far future.
Meantime, on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS), Watt planned to lease a billion acres (ten times the
area of California) before 1984. Before that, major oil firms already
had about 1/5 of that area under lease, looking many years or several decades
ahead of need. This helps explain why a contemporary Alaska sale, on old Naval
Petroleum Reserve (NPR 4), fetched only 14% of the anticipated amount.
Who buys to hold these vast
reserves for distant future use? They are of investment grade only for those
with waiting power. Unripe lands and resources are probably the most closely
held assets there are. Poor people and small businessmen need busy capital right
now. Only a few of the wealthiest people have the deep pockets and slack money
to buy far ahead, to maintain high reserve/output ratios. These markets in far
future values are their special preserve.
What is being bought?
Are these not "leases," contracts to pay rent? No, these leases are not
that. Here is the heart of Pseudo-Socialism. The U.S. Government leases
mineral-prone lands under the "Bonus Bid System," whereby most of the payment is
required up front in spot cash. This makes a "lease" more like a sale, a sale in
which buyers are screened by their banking connections rather than by their
ability to find and produce hydrocarbons.
The bonus system originated
on private uplands. It was a way for big oil firms to dazzle various rustics,
pressed for cash, by tempting them with front money for their mineral rights.
The companies had the cash, the connections, and intimidating expertise; they
wrote the rules their way. The rules included a cap of 12.5% on the long-term
"royalty," the only means by which lessors participated over the long pull, and
retained a share in gushers and bonanzas that proved in excess of original
estimates - estimates much better known to the bidders than the lessors. When
the companies moved onto public lands they brought the same system with them. It
was by then an ?industry standard?, and who can argue with
that?
The only "bid variable" in this
system is the bonus. With the royalty capped, there are large potential
surpluses to attract bonus bids. The Physiocratic rule of compensation applies:
a low royalty translates into a high leasehold value. The advantage of this to
"the industry" - meaning the largest firms that are its most visible spokesmen
and exemplars - is that it screens out many bidders, those pressed for front
money. It reserves the field for a much smaller number of players, increasing
their bargaining power.
All that may sound familiar
to students of 19th Century American history, and the privatization of the vast
Federal domain. It is a long story of conflict between cash sales and more
democratic means of placing lands. Those with cash and bank connections
naturally favored cash sales. President Jefferson saw the merit in credit sales,
so from 1801-20, sales were on credit. The system was badly administered, but so
were all other systems of land disposal tried in that era. Collections became a
problem, yet landownership was democratized. It enabled Andrew Jackson to
proclaim on Thanksgiving Day, 1835, "We thank Thee for the absence of
unemployment which in the King-ridden countries of the world is causing
widespread suffering among the toiling masses and has led to riots ... (and
that) there will be none to freeze, starve, or be beset by the fear of want this
winter or the winters yet to come."
Following the period of
credit sales, the return to cash sales re-introduced front-money bias. Small
owners still had ways of fighting back, however, at the state and local levels.
States and counties and their subdivisions relied mainly on the property tax.
They used this with good effect, often quite deliberately, to induce absentee
speculators to release large holdings for sale and settlement. The impact of
land taxes is analogous to that of credit sales. The specter of future taxes is
capitalized into lower current land prices. They in turn let one buy cheaper up
front, in return for a higher level of deferred payments. The net effect is like
extending permanent credit on equal terms to all potential buyers, something
private credit markets never do or could be expected to do.
In this era, local property
taxes, mostly administered by counties, were the most democratizing influence.
They were a matter of intense conflict between median Americans and speculators,
some absentee (like Cornell University in Wisconsin, documented by Paul Gates)
and some resident (like the Hudson Valley Patroons, documented by David Ellis).
There is a literature on these conflicts, inadequate but clear, but missing from
the ?dumbed-down? and bowdlerized history texts foisted on most
students.
Thus, the property tax,
especially on land, is twice effective as an instrument of Distributive
Socialism. First, it rifles in on the rent surplus and socializes it. Second, it
democratizes the ownership and operating control of land. Thus it achieves
something akin to the "worker control" that is an ideal avowed by many modern
Socialists, melding egalitarian distribution with egalitarian management and
control. To be sure, it does so in a small-business framework, an ideal that is
traditionally Populist, not Marxist. However, in this new post-Communist age,
when Socialists are seeking new ways to express their yearnings for the good
society, they might want to reconsider the value of this approach to
worker control. Perhaps Marx, like other reformers of his generation, was
oversold on the economies and inevitable triumph of large scale capital and
organization, and the substitution of capital for labor. Perhaps small is
beautiful, after all.
Today's industry is faced
less with the property tax than the income tax. Most state property taxes are
applied only at low levels to mineral-bearing lands. Worse, the most active
leasing today is on the OCS, outside the tax reach of any state or county, and
so exempt from property taxation.
The Federal income tax does reach out to
the OCS. Its effect, however is to redouble the industry's support for the bonus
system by treating bonuses most favorably. The bonus, being a cost of land
acquisition, might normally not be easily deductible or depreciable. Oil and gas
are exhaustible, however, so the bonus might
reasonably be
written off slowly on a unit-of-extraction basis, or by means of the depletion
allowance where that is still used. In the distinctive conditions of frontier
oil exploration, however, much of the bonuses paid are deducted before
extraction even begins.
It works like this. In the
normal course of exploration, some five leaseholds are taken and explored for
every one where post-leasing drilling will show commercially producible
hydrocarbons. The other four may be "abandoned," which means the lessee formally
terminates the lease. At this time, which the lessee may choose at his tax
convenience, all bonuses previously paid are taken as current expenses, fully
deductible in the year of abandonment. In addition, all pre-leasing exploration
costs that the lessee assigns to the abandoned leaseholds are expensed also.
Thus, before extraction begins, the exploring firm may have expensed 80% of its
land acquisition costs.
Expensing on so large a
scale is useful, of course, mainly to large, diversified firms with other income
against which to take the expenses. Partnerships of high-tax-bracket individuals
are also involved. This works in tandem with high front-money requirements to
screen out smaller, leaner firms, leaving easier pickings for the larger firms
and deeper pockets.
The lease not abandoned,
whose value has been acquired and built-up by costs that are mostly expensed,
may now be sold as a "capital asset," with all the preferential tax treatments
appurtenant thereto. The buyer, in turn, now begins a new set of games for
deducting his acquisition cost. We do not spell these out, but the overall
result is extremely easy tax treatment compared with most other businesses.
Many economists allege that
the bonus system is the best way to collect rent from the public lands. The
lands are public; the industry pays for them; bidding is modestly competitive;
and the industry is subject to taxation. All those conditions seem favorable to
making it a case of applied Distributive Socialism. However, for the reasons
given, the net result deserves better to be called
"Pseudo-Socialism."
III. ADMINISTERING PUBLIC LANDS FOR JUSTICE AND
EFFICIENCY
Here are four corners of an
effective policy for socializing rent from public lands: participate in
revenues; control time of lease sales for the seller's best advantage;
participate in exploration; and participate in marketing. Some detail follows.
The writer has elaborated the points elsewhere.
A. Participating in
revenues
1.
Defer payments. Access to private equity and credit is extremely uneven, putting
most potential bidders at a fatal disadvantage relative to the wealthy few.
Deferring payments according to any uniform formula has the same effect as
extending long-term credit to all parties on equal
terms.
2.
Vary payments according to what is on the site, as that is disclosed by
exploration and extraction. This shares risk with the lessee, and has somewhat
the same effect as providing insurance. It does somewhat dilute incentives at
the margin, but this can be largely offset by sharing in costs. Arguably, such
risk-sharing actually raises marginal incentives, on balance. Such, at least, is
a standard theorem in the literature of income taxation.
Such
variation of payments, as with a royalty, also shares other kinds of risks, like
price.
3.
Give credits for lessee inputs, writing these off against later
royalties.
4.
Leave a bid variable to soak up any advantage of the leasehold site that the
lessor has overlooked in setting the parameter charges, but sharp or sanguine
bidders detect. Thus exploit the Physiocratic rule of compensation.
5.
Limit the area leased to any one person or firm, especially where there is a
high royalty rate (lessor participation), and consequent low cost to lessors of
holding land unused. This is the practise of private landlords, as analyzed and
documented in the works of Stephen Cheung.
B. Timing lease
sales
Sales
need to be deferred until the lands are economically "ripe," from the seller's
viewpoint. Ripeness, roughly speaking, is a condition when the growth rate of
value over time falls to equal or below the interest rate. "Value," in this
context, is the anticipated high bid. The tendency today is to time sales by
industry "nominations," meaning at the convenience of certain powerful members
of the industry. These may well be firms that have a lead in exploring a certain
frontier area, and a competitive edge to exploit before other firms know as much
as they. Even if several firms are involved, every member of the group would
like to get in on the steep part of the growth curve, meaning growth of
value.
C. Participating in
exploration
Public
landlords today generally know less about their own property than do private
firms. The firms have leave to range all over unleased lands, taking seismic
soundings, studying satellite images, developing sophisticated, top-secret
computerized models of the geology, even doing a bit of exploratory, pre-leasing
drilling. When potential lessees know more than the public's agents, the
latter's bargaining power is deeply
eroded.
The
public may protect itself in several ways. One is to do some drilling of its own
-- it may hire the same contractors used by industry. Another is by
checkerboarding followed by "drainage sales": sales of parcels abutting proved
producing leaseholds. A third is by registering all well
logs.
D. Participating in
marketing
Royalties
received by lessors are a percentage of wellhead price, but who sets the
price? Transfer pricing scams are all too common in an
industry whose dominant firms are vertically integrated. The public landlord may
well want to take its share of production in kind, using its own marketing
agency, to avoid being exploited. The mere threat of such a yardstick would have
a profound effect on wellhead pricing.
E. Emulating good
examples
Norway is
probably the best example of a nation that harnessed its public domain revenues
of oil and gas for the public good. Botswana has done remarkably well with its
diamonds, another extractive resource, guided by a one-time Schalkenbach
grantee, Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. Whoever wades into this complex subject should
steep himself in such good experiences, if only to prove that success, justice
and efficiency are possible, however rare.
CONCLUSION
Is there any chance that
Distributive Socialism will make headway on the OCS, and other Federal
lands? There is always a chance. The lands, after all, are public, as a
matter of history and law. A business-oriented administration need not call it
any kind of "Socialism." It should and might even actually pride itself on
businesslike management of public assets. It is our little secret that
businesslike management in this case is the essence of Distributive
Socialism.
What about James
Watt? He was the most unpopular figure in Reagan's Cabinet, just as
Douglas McKay was in Eisenhower's, and Albert Fall was in Harding's. The public
does not find giveaways and sweetheart deals attractive. On the other hand the
public does not always recognize giveaways when there is some subtlety involved.
The appearance of open bidding, and substantial bonus payments for leaseholds,
may be enough to appease the public, the more so when the appearance of true
competition is reinforced by the endorsement of many mainline economists.
What must be inculcated in
everyone's thinking is the essential difference between competition with
front money, and competition where payments are deferred. The first is limited
competition, with places reserved for an affluent few. The second is evenhanded,
democratic competition on a more level playing field, where preferential access
to credit confers no differential advantage. This is the condition under which
Distributive Socialism can coexist with, and reinforce, a free market economy.
It is achieved on fee simple lands by subjecting them to heavy land taxes,
whereby newcomers can buy in at low prices in return for paying more over time.
It is achieved on public lands by writing leases with high lessor participation
over time, and low bonuses required up front.