(Nov-Dec. 2008 GroundSwell)
_____________________INSIGHTS____________________
WHAT?S THE MATTER WITH MICHIGAN? RISE AND
COLLAPSE OF AN ECONOMIC WONDER
By Dr. Mason Gaffney, Riverside,
CA
In 1995, through an accident of
scheduling, two separate meetings were merged at the Levy Institute,
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY. It was an odd coupling: one group was of
Georgists; the other was of economic advisers to Governor John Engler of
Michigan, intent on cutting the property tax. Possibly some hurried planner, we
speculated, had confused Michigan?s ?Single Business Tax? with George?s ?Single
Tax?. Still for three days we talked to, or at least past each other.
We warned Michigan what had happened to California
after Prop. 13. In Lansing, however, the die had been cast. Engler?s
advisors tuned out our words and went home to help him take public schools off
the property tax and put them on a sales tax. Michigan?s fatal downslide
accelerated. Let us trace her path from adolescence and vigor through long
dominance down to senility, where famous firms are dying, industrial cities
rotting, great universities shedding, public services declining, public schools
starving, unemployment soaring, and youth fleeing. Michigan?s number of
apportioned U.S. Representatives has dropped from 19 in 1960 to 15 in 2000. The
great University of Michigan now charges the highest tuition of any public
university in the nation. Michigan?s ?Big 3? auto firms have crashed loudly and
publicly, going to Washington to beg.
I. Hazen Pingree, mass transit, high wages, and the birth of the auto
industry.
From 1890-1900 Detroit?s population grew, in spite
of the depression, by 40%. That was faster than almost all other cities except
Cleveland. By 1910 it had boomed another 60%, leading the nation, and by
1920 another 113%. The auto industry did it, but why in Detroit? It
helped that Michigan had produced horse-drawn carriages from its hardwood
lumber, but so had other places. It was not low wages, for Detroit paid
better than most, which of course is why so many people moved there so
fast. It was not business-dominated politics, for Michigan was a
Progressive state, a Bull Moose T.R. state, the first eastern state to adopt the
Initiative and Referendum, an early Home-Rule-for-cities state, an early adopter
of direct election of U.S. Senators, a high tax state (in an era when most state
and local taxes were property taxes). Governor Hazen Pingree?s 1897 message to
the State Legislature is a strikingly radical document, even for its times, and
moreso for today.
Mayor Hazen Pingree, soon to be Governor, was an
early Georgist Progressive. He found city taxes biased for the rich; he
changed that, and pushed the single-tax principle. He was a mentor to and
model for the Georgist soon-to-be Mayors Tom Johnson and Newton Baker of
Cleveland, and Samuel Jones and Brand Whitlock of Toledo. Pingree reformed
assessments and raised property taxes in order to provide vital services for
working men and their families. Mass transit, then called ?traction?, was
a central issue.
The Progressive single-tax movement then went
hand-in-hand with ?traction? in all the growing cities of that, their Golden
Age. Property taxes were to cover fixed costs, so as to keep fares
low. Pingree could not sway enough allies to municipalize traction, so
instead he subsidized a competing firm, forcing the older one to lower fares and
extend service. It is one of history?s ironies: trolley cars nursed the auto
industry that was later to rise up and slay them.
Pingree plugged for public ownership of city
monopolies and for low fares, an attitude later to be rationalized by many
academics as ?marginal-cost pricing?. Property taxes also paid for public
education, public health, public parks, water, sanitation, welfare, ? all the
public services that make a big city livable, and its small industries
viable. Property tax rates of 2.5% were normal; there were no sales taxes,
business taxes, or income taxes. Detroit?s private sector was a big collection
of small machine shops, little businesses and services providing a matrix for
the famous innovators who were to spawn the auto industry. Jane Jacobs
would have venerated it, as she did Tokyo and Birmingham.
Land speculation and monopoly were problems, so in
1891 Pingree campaigned for ?higher taxes on the vast landed estates of the
city?, and won. In 1893 a big industry threatened to leave town if its
taxes rose. Pingree was losing this battle when he called on his Georgism
and raised just the land assessments. This won the support of businesses
he had alienated by campaigning to soak the rich (Holli, Reform in Detroit,
p.59).
Pingree saw, and ordinary voters could see, that
Detroit could raise revenues from industry without driving it away, simply by
focusing assessments more on land, less on capital. Since then a century of
rococo decadence in economic analysis lets a leading Michigan tax authority
write that ?Michigan ? is reluctant to impose taxes at high rates on economic
activity that might thereby be reduced or encouraged to relocate. In this,
Michigan faces the same dilemma that all taxing jurisdictions face? (James R.
Hines, Jr., 2003, Michigan?s Flirtation with The Single Business Tax.) To solve
the dilemma, Hines touts Michigan?s ?Single Business Tax? (SBT), a form of
Value-added Tax in which businesses can deduct purchases of real estate, but not
labor payrolls, from the tax base. Deducting real estate purchases as though
they were current expenses is supposed to help Michigan by untaxing capital
formation, as though real estate were all capital, and buying old capital is the
same as creating new. Professor Hines is Director of Research at a leading
professional think-tank, The Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR), University of
Michigan. He is actually savvy and fair-minded in most respects, likable,
credentialed, modern, and well-connected - too modern and well-connected to be
free of Neo-classical bias that conflates land with capital.
The crash of 1893 hit Detroit soon after Pingree
became Mayor. The City was riddled with holes held by land speculators. Pingree
prevailed on them to let the unemployed plant vegetables there, and
?Pingree?s Potato Patches? won national renown, and inspired other cities
to do likewise (Catlin, pp. 609, 616). To Pingree the publicist and
politician this was a graphic way to demonstrate to his voters, fresh from
following the plow, what people can do when given access to land, a goal he had
for all industries. He used tax money on welfare for the unemployed, a move that
did not spoil labor so much as it kept it on hand to man the next industrial
boom. His majorities increased with each election.
Another irony is that the traction monopoly that Pingree
fought was owned by none other than Tom Johnson. The relationship was
complex, but this is part of the process that converted Johnson to become the
most prominent Georgist politician of his decade ? think Epiphany on the road to
Damascus.
Pingree also supported academic freedom, a fragile
seedling in that era. He did not quail at taking and probably paying for
advice from economist Edward Bemis, whom Rockefeller?s new University of Chicago
had just fired for the solecism of supporting the Pullman strikers in
1894. Polite academicians just don?t do things like that.
In 1897 Pingree became Governor. He centralized the
assessment of property taxes, and had the State Board of Tax Commissioners
revalue all property. They found so much untaxed land, especially railroad
holdings, to put on the rolls that they actually lowered tax rates even as they
raised more taxes (Lovett, p.37) ? a feat that inspired Robert LaFollette across
the lake later to emulate in Wisconsin. Arthur Laffer failed to duplicate
the success later in Washington because Laffer and his boss, Ronald Reagan,
never got the point that was so obvious to Pingree: lower bad taxes by raising
the good one.
In the midst of reforms, Pingree died in 1901. He
had not worked alone, however, and in 1904 new Governor Fred Warner resumed
Pingree?s work and in 1908 won his 3rd term. In 1909 Michigan adopted a new
constitution with many basic progressive reforms. The State continued its
extraordinary growth and prosperity. Detroit grew from 205,000 souls in
1890 to 1,850,000 in 1950, a faster percentage growth rate than any other city,
rising to be America?s 4th biggest city. This was an extreme case of a
national pattern for cities with pro-labor Georgist leadership to outgrow cities
run by the opposition (Gaffney, 2006, New Growth in Old Cities, pp.34-36). As
for urban sprawl, Pingree favored growth without annexation ? a formula that
later growthmen were to forget, to their sorrow.
II. The stagnant Upper Peninsula (The U.P.)
Meantime the U.P. was stagnant. Longfellow in The
Song of Hiawatha had romanticized it as ?Gitche Gumi? (Ojibway for Lake
Superior). Ben Smith, a retired engineer from Grand Rapids, saw it more
realistically as a land of barons and peasants, and not many of either (1975,
Latifundia in Gitche Gumi). Its owners managed to escape from Pingree?s
reforms, so the U.P. remained an economic desert, even while the L.P. was making
homes and jobs for millions. These owners were and are few, and tightly
organized to resist taxes. They are timber firms and mining firms, or at least
the owners of mineral land that someone might mine some day.
The U.P. is not barren of resources. It has
hundreds of miles of shoreline on the Great Lakes hard by what was the
industrial heartland of the U.S. Inland it has vast forestlands and
reserves of copper, iron, and who knows what other minerals. Its problem
is more like the economists? ?Dutch disease? of excessive easy riches.
Under Michigan?s Forest Tax Law the State exempts
all ?certified commercial forests? from the ad valorem property tax. 14%
of the U.P. is thus exempted. Instead, the owners pay 15? per acre - and
the State pays the county 25? per acre with money drawn from L.P. taxpayers
(Smith, p.115). This break for timber is not unique to Michigan:
California is just as bad, so its northern forest counties are also economic
deserts, and parasites on the State fisc. Both States have outstanding
Schools of Forestry whose personnel, advising legislators and owners, are
complicit in these arrangements. Alabama is even worse, as Law School Professor
and Christian activist Susan Pace Hamill and her ally, Governor Bob Riley, have
recently brought out as they bumped heads with the timberland owners ? and
lost. In New Hampshire, forest landowners have led in squelching bills
submitted by Assemblyman Richard Noyes for a statewide land tax. Forest
landowners are a problem for Georgists everywhere ? a big topic for another
day.
Under Michigan?s mineral tax law, newly discovered
ore is exempt for 10 years. In practice the effect of that and other laws
is that ?Virtually all iron ore land is exempt from taxation.? Before 1963
it was done illegally; a 1963 Act made it legal (Smith pp. 115-17). There
is a nominal severance tax, but Smith illustrates how owners of iron ore in the
Marquette Range dodge it.
Smith?s monograph is full of vignettes, such as
that in Keweenaw County (in 1975), 80% of the private surface land is owned by
one copper company, Calumet & Hecla Corporation, a subsidiary of Universal
Oil Products.
We omit the U.P., therefore, from the following
history: it is a stagnant world, living on the L.P., unrelieved by the cycles of
at least occasional prosperity that make the L.P. more livable.
III. Urban sprawl around Detroit in the 1920?s; it?s awful
collapse
By 1930 Detroit had 68% more people than in 1920,
again leading the nation. 1920?s leaders, however, were not like the Progressive
Republicans of yore, they were New Era Republicans of what Michigan?s Professor
Kenneth Boulding was to call ?The Cowboy Economy?. They twisted
Pingree?s ideas by growing in area even more than in people. Detroit?s
best-known product, marketed to millions, let builders sprawl over outskirts and
suburbs to a degree hitherto unthinkable. Detroit?s rich tax base, misspent,
helped them do it.
Michigan Business Professor Ernest M. Fisher,
normally a tame and timid soul given to understatement, documented the damages
in monographs and articles that became minor classics of boom and bust in urban
expansion. Most American cities underwent the same process, but
Detroit, like Florida, sprawled well beyond the average. Hard-luck Flint
became a poster-child victim of sprawl and land speculation, singled out for
attention by leading planner Edmund Bacon (1940, ?A Diagnosis?).
Harold S. Buttenheim, Georgist Editor of the then-influential American
City Magazine, focused on Detroit. Today, as GM closes down Flint?s
life-support, publicist Michael Moore is republicizing Flint as
poster-child. Neither glare of publicity has cured Flint?s problems,
however; that would require stronger measures.
IV. Michigan in the Great Depression
Detroit, like most big industrial cities, slowed
down in the ?Dirty Thirties?. Many cities shrunk; Detroit did better,
growing by 3.5%. Still, its people knew hard times, and searched for
new ideas and leaders. It produced at least three prominent new men from
outside the establishment, who led it in the New Deal direction. These were
Charles Coughlin, Frank Murphy, and Walter Reuther. Coughlin and Murphy
flashed across history?s stage and faded. Reuther, working in the grubby
trenches and staying home, was to have the more lasting impact. In modern terms
you could call him a ?community organizer?.
Fr. Charles Coughlin was pastor of a small church in
Royal Oak, a northern inner suburb of Detroit. He mastered early on the
new medium of radio, even before FDR, and amassed a huge following in the early
depression years. He saw social salvation in the 1931 Encyclical of Pope
Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (40 Years Later), an update of Pope Leo
XIII?s Rerum Novarum, 1891. He popularized those messages as
never before. They bear an uncanny likeness to FDR?s New Deal, much of it framed
by Irish and other Catholics whom they touched through Coughlin. The story
of Coughlin?s sensational rise and tragic fall is told at length in Gaffney,
2000, Henry George, Fr. Edward McGlynn, and Pope Leo XIII. Suffice it
here that Coughlin?s Michigan springboard rocketed him so fast to national and
international fame and influence and controversy that he had little role in
Michigan.
Frank Murphy, Detroit?s Mayor 1930-33, was ?a New
Dealer before there was a New Deal? (Sidney Fine, biographer, 1984), and helped
elect FDR. By all accounts he was of high character and ability and
ambition. FDR bundled him off to the Philippines as Governor-General
(possibly to exile a potential rival?). Murphy returned to become one of
Michigan?s few Democratic Governors. During his tenure (1936-38) Walter
Reuther?s fledgling UAW pioneered the sit-down strike at GM?s plant in
Flint. Governor Murphy called out the national guard, but refused to
authorize violence. Instead he negotiated a settlement that legitimized the UAW,
using the new national Wagner Act. It was ?The strike heard round the
world?. UAW membership exploded from 30,000 to 500,000. ?Industrial unionism?
had arrived to rival and later join the old AFL. Organized labor, for better or
worse, has been a major political player ever since. Murphy went on to become
A.G. in 1939, and then a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, but thus ended his
role in Michigan.
Walter Reuther was a socialist from a socialist family,
organizing unions in a time of violence when employerscontrolled the police and
the FBI. He survived beatings by strikebreakers, and two assassination
attempts before finally falling to a third one in 1970. He couldn?t get
elected even to the Detroit City Council, yet TIME Magazine included him with
the 100 most influential people of the 20th Century. He turned Republican
Michigan into a union state, and his union into a major national political
force. From 1939 he became a Democrat, increasingly on intimate terms with
Party leaders. He never stopped supporting liberal causes (Martin Luther King,
Jr., C?sar Chavez) until he was slain. Even today, it is said, Senate
Republicans oppose bailing out Detroit auto-makers to avoid helping out
Reuther?s creation, the UAW.
All this time, with all this excitement, with boom
and bust in the land market, Michigan fiscs depended mainly on the property
tax. From 1932, other states were turning to sales taxes for ?property tax
relief?, but not Michigan, not yet. Doughty Ben Smith of Grand Rapids, he who
wrote about the U.P., churned out reams of essays and tables of data
demonstrating that states progressed economically in the measure that they used
the property tax to finance government. It is tragic he didn?t live long
enough to polish and package his works better; they were diamonds in the
rough.
V. Detroit in the arsenal of democracy, 1940-50
After 1940, and especially after Pearl Harbor, FDR
naturally turned to Detroit to convert its assembly lines and supply sources to
war production. The whole nation revived, but Detroit grew by 14% while most
cities grew by much less, and many shrank. This was the age of Rosie the
Riveter, but Rosie favored Detroit over most other venues. Walter Reuther
the anti-fascist converted to a Democrat; Reuther the German-American squelched
wildcat strikes against the war effort; Reuther the born Marxist purged
communists from his unions, joined the cold war, and rated high in
Washington. He was a man for his times. It would appear that Detroit
and Michigan were back on the fast track.
VI. Famous Governors and meager results, 1950-70
From 1950-60, Detroit shrank by 10%, the first
break in its sensational upward trajectory. What could the matter be?
?Explainers? could blame an exogenous force, the end of the war, but demand for
autos and trucks was booming: America was pouring billions into the Interstate
Highway System. The St. Lawrence Seaway was on track to open in 1959. The
world was buying American cars. The causes must have been
endogenous.
1952 brought on Governor G. Mennen ?Soapy? Williams,
scion of an old Detroit family (Mennen toiletries), handsome, personable, an
academic ?prodigy?, eastern prep, Princeton, Michigan Law School,
ambitious, cover of TIME, and presidential timber. Like Murphy, he won as a
Democrat in a Republican state. In Michigan, party lines are fuzzier and
politicians more temperate than in Wisconsin and Minnesota. (Ethnically, one
might guess it reflects the Dutch temperament vs. the central European, but that
is speculative.
In 1952 the new Governor Williams allied with old
warrior Reuther, and represented some of his views. He saw a need for more
state services. Michigan had no state income tax at that time ? only half the
states did, and Michigan?s neighbors and competitors Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois
did not (Hines, p.11). Taxing ?business? may have sounded good to Reuther,
the intellectual steeped in Marxist economics.
Williams? 1953 tax was called the Business
Activities Tax (BAT). Technically it was an odd duck, a kind of modified
VAT that ?the business community? (as Professor Hines calls it) preferred to a
tax on corporate income. If it and Williams? new welfare programs helped
Michigan grow one could not prove it from Detroit?s falling population.
Michigan overall still grew, as Detroit was hollowing out; but Michigan grew
slower than the national average, losing another Congressional seat. It stood
still compared with, say, California. As for Williams he was shuffled off,
like Murphy before him, to minor foreign posts. He came home and ended his
career as Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. His lasting memorial is
the long expensive Mackinac bridge, a 1950s version of a ?bridge to nowhere?,
for it links the L.P. only with the barren U.P., which remains barren since it
needs another kind of therapy.
The next famous Governor was George Romney,
1962-68, a hero because he had rescued American Motors by promoting the Rambler
(although it was made in Wisconsin). Romney was a ?liberal Republican? (as the
term was then understood), loosely allied with Nelson Rockefeller who loaned him
economic adviser George Gilder, co-author with Jude Wanniski of early
?supply-side? works. He viewed Reuther as ?the most dangerous man in
America? because Reuther had a visionary and idealistic side, when Romney
might better have sided with Reuther against primitive Jimmy Hoffa, Reuther?s
arch-enemy. Romney introduced an income tax to help support public schools
and provide ?property tax relief?, a p.r. catchword that caught on in the times.
Meantime the property tax itself was degenerating,
nationwide, into more of a tax on buildings, less on land, through confusion and
corruption in the assessment process. One can trace this openly in professional
and scholarly books and articles on appraisal and assessment ? material for
another article. Manuals from the International Association of Assessing
Officers (IAAO) grew increasing muddled. The John C. Lincoln Foundation,
supposedly dedicated to advancing the ideas found in Progress and
Poverty by Henry George, was devoting major funding to promote
?Computer-Assisted Mass Appraisal? (CAMA)of buildings, but not of land values.
Detroit was assessing land values at next to nil,
using assessments dating from the Great Depression (Andelson, 2000, p.163,
citing James Clarkson, Mayor of Southfield), and no one was doing anything about
it. Economists weren?t even writing about it, not even talking about it.
So Ben Smith?s faith in the invigorating powers of property taxation had less
basis than before, even as the property tax itself was being diluted with other
revenues. One Michigan city, Southfield, made itself an outstanding
exception with outstanding results, treated below.
Note in passing that the part of the property tax
that falls on capital, bad as it is, is not as bad as taxes on income, sales,
value-added, or business activity. The key word is activity. The property
tax penalizes capital for standing still; the activity taxes penalize it for
moving
The late 1960s saw riots related to race and civil
rights in many cities, but Detroit?s in 1967 were so bad that President LBJ sent
in U.S. troops. Candidate Romney had courted blacks more than previous
Republicans had, but he was a prominent leader in his Mormon Church. At
that time (before 1978) this Church denied blacks full membership its
(?priesthood?), and had a long if ambiguous and arguable record of
discrimination in its sacred texts (blacks were ?Lamanites?). That did not
sit well in the new era of civil rights, although many other churches
discriminated too, de facto.
Governor Romney had also been preoccupied during
this, his last term, seeking the Republican nomination for U.S. President. The
12th Street Detroit Riots in 1967 damaged both him and LBJ, both of whom dropped
out of the race. Romney was also condemned for opposing the war, and LBJ
for waging it, but as that does not make sense it seems likely that their poor
handling of the riots played a role. They never recovered, and neither has
Detroit.
In 1967, more quietly, Michigan dropped its ?BAT?
and replaced it with a regular corporate income tax. This tax lacks some
of the worst features of the BAT, but they were soon to return in the ?Single
Business Tax? (SBT), discussed below.
VII. Southfield booms while Detroit busts
While Detroit hollowed out, its suburb Southfield
boomed. From 1950-70 it more than tripled from 19,000 to 69,000 people. It
had a Georgist Mayor, James Clarkson, who made a point of raising land
assessments and lowering building assessments. How can a mayor do that?
Clarkson observed there is wide latitude in the assessment process, which most
assessors were using to underassess land. Southfield?s Assessor had been valuing
land at 10% or less of market value. In 1960 Clarkson, like Pingree in
1890, campaigned for Mayor to correct that. Meeting resistance, he hired a
Georgist assessor, Ted Gwartney, and had him upvalue land and downvalue
buildings. Gwartney had honed this skill earlier working for Dr. Irene Hickman,
elected Assessor of Sacramento County, California, who was also an activist
Georgist. Clarkson served four terms before the Michigan powers lured him
away with a judgeship (Andelson 2000, pp. 162 ff.). Gwartney left to
pursue a distinguished career elsewhere. Southfield immediately leveled
off at 76,000 people and has not grown since.
Harvard Law Professor Oliver Oldman, a leading tax
authority, scoffed at the evidence, at a meeting we both attended. Southfield
was merely taking advantage of Detroit?s problems, in his view, and exploiting
white flight. Southfield was engaging in competitive undertaxation, a
?race to the bottom. Such, unfortunately, has been the academic p.c. mindset,
screening out examples like Southfield?s.
Southfield?s tax base actually rose by 20% per year
under Clarkson/Gwartney, and it provided good utilities and public
services. Even the landowners whose assessments Gwartney raised made out
well because the benefit of the relief of potential buildings from overtaxation
was shifted to landowners in higher market values. It was rather Detroit
that was ?racing to the bottom?.
VIII. The ?Single Business Tax? (SBT), 1975
In 1975 Michigan adopted its distinctive ?Single
Business Tax? (SBT), replacing the corporate income tax. This is a variety of
VAT, a tax on gross receipts less certain deductions. First, as with any
VAT, one deducts purchases from other firms, reasoning they have been taxed
already on the value they added. One does NOT deduct labor costs.
Michigan?s SBT has two especially bad
features. One is that unincorporated businesses, mostly small, are as
subject to the tax as corporations, some gigantic. The other is that
buying real estate, including land, is deductible as a current expense (Hines,
p.16). Logically buying land should not even be depreciable, since land
does not wear out, and a fortiori should not be expensible in the year
purchased. Imagine owners A and B selling a parcel of land to each other in
alternate years, each buyer expensing it each time! It amounts to a great
subsidy for holding land. At any rate, by 1980 Detroit had dropped another
20% of its people from 1970. No other state has adopted this kind of
tax.
IX. Governor John Engler scuppers the property tax, 1995
In 1995 Governor John Engler decided to heal
Michigan by taking its public schools off the property tax. This is when
we Georgists met with his staff at the Levy Institute. Playing Cassandra,
here is the advice I offered in 1995.
?What happens when a state radically slashes
its property tax? Michiganders are saying they must wait and see, but
there is no need for that: California can show you 17 years of experience.
To read your future, just study our past. Here is what has happened since
California passed Proposition 13 in 1978.
The obvious direct results have been to
cut public services, raise other taxes, and lose credit rating. Our school
support fell from #5, nationally, to #40 in 1985 when last seen, still
falling. County road maintenance is down to where my county (Riverside) is
repaving its roads at an annual rate of once every 130 years. Once in 20
years is recommended here, and up north you generally need higher
frequency. You can't just build infrastructure and then stop paying for
it, it's a perpetual commitment. Thanks to urban sprawl, a high fraction
of our population now depends on these county roads.
In 1978 we had a surplus in Sacramento. Since
then we have raised business taxes, income taxes, sales taxes and gas taxes, but
go broke every June. Now our State bond rating is last among the
states. One of our richest counties (Orange) has gone bankrupt; Los
Angeles is on the brink of it, saving itself by closing emergency rooms and
hospitals that serve as a last resort for the uninsured poor.
The private sector is doing badly,
too. Raising income taxes, business taxes, and sales taxes is no way to
stimulate an economy; they are all a drag on work and enterprise. Our
income pc was down from #7 to #12 among the states by 1992, then fell some
more. From 1992-94, California was one of three states where median
household income fell. Our unemployment rate is 9%, 50% higher than the
national mean of 6%. Our poverty rate is 18%, compared to 14.5%
nationally. Not surprisingly, therefore, the only government function that
grows now is building and operating prisons. One of our few rebounding
industries is cinema, the art of escaping from reality: we excel at that.
Another thriving activity is that of auctioning off used machinery for export to
the east.
In 1993 there was net outmigration
(including international migration) from this state that has symbolized American
growth since time immemorial. It is unheard of. 426,000 people were
lost, nearly 2% of the population. This is a watershed change: imagine of
all states California, America's trend-setter, our El Dorado, The Golden State,
our Horn of Plenty, the safety-valve for job-seekers and retirees and
entrepreneurs from everywhere, the end of the rainbow, losing population!
It's almost enough to make a person click off the tube and think.
The fall of our income pc is greater than
appears from the purely monetary measure. Real pay has fallen more,
because of the drastic rise of shelter prices. In San Francisco, shelter
takes 50% of the median income, with many other cities, especially coastal ones,
not far behind. It is unusual to find livable quarters for less than
$600/mo. The median home price rose 163% during the 1980s, to $258,000
(remember that is just the median - the mean is higher). These rises are
part of the C.O.L. of all renters and new buyers, a part not fully incorporated
in standard CPI measures (for various unworthy reasons too technical to open up
now).
Some cities are in desperate
straits. San Bernardino in 1976 was chosen an "All-America City, a City on
the Go." It went, all right: today, 40% of its people are on
welfare.
California has always been earthquake
country, but has always renewed itself, routinely. It was different after
the Northridge quake in the San Fernando Valley, January, 1994. This is
the upper-middle neighborhood of Los Angeles, but now large pockets of ruined
buildings remain, unreconstructed, inhabited only by vagrants and criminals: an
instant Bronx West. These blighted sections, ominous portents, spread more
blight around them.
It should give one pause. It is, however,
if you think about it, the expectable result of what the voters did. They
turned property from a functional concept into a sacred one; from a commission
to be enterprising, hire people, produce goods, and pay taxes into a welfare
entitlement. They rejected the concept of a tax on inert wealth in favor
of the rival concept of taxing liquidity and cash flow. The predictable
result is to inhibit economic activity, and encourage holding wealth inert and
stagnant.
We had a construction boom in the 1980s,
but it was not healthy. It was marked by extreme sprawl, and extreme
instability. Downtown L.A. was to become a great new financial capital,
but now has nearly the highest office vacancy rate in the U.S., with of course a
high rate of builder bankruptcies. Speculative builders were led on to
overbuild, in part, by anticipated higher land rents and prices. This
Lorelei effect was magnified by national income-tax provisions luring on
speculative builders, but we have to ask why California fell harder than other
states, even with the object-lessons of the oil states in clear
view.
David Shulman tersely summarized the
distributive effects of Prop. 13 as he left us for Salamon Brothers in
Manhattan: "it breached the social compact." Alienation is the result, and
the Rodney King riots, arson and looting are the results of alienation.
True, the Watts riots preceded Prop. 13, but they were part of a national
epidemic. By 1967 there were riots with arson and looting in 70 or more
American cities. The Rodney King riots were endemic to California, and
spread over a much wider area of Los Angeles than the Watts riots did. The
looters and arsonists were not all black, and the targets were not all white,
but mainly Korean-Americans who just happened to be there minding their
stores.
Conventional wisdom blames our bust on
the end of the Cold War. Surely that is a factor, but as a causal
explanation it is too pat, too easy, and a-historical. Compare today with
1945. Los Angeles' economy depended much more on The Hot War, 1940-1945,
than it ever did on The Cold War. Los Angeles' wartime boom had swelled
its population as no other great city, 1940-45. After 1945 the U.S. pulled
the plug on defense spending, more than today. Jane Jacobs, in The Economy
of Cities, tells us what happened to military spending in Los Angeles after
1945. It lost 3/4 of its aircraft workers, and 80% of its
shipbuilders. It lost its military and naval overseas supply and
replacement businesses. Troops stopped funneling through. It got
worse: petroleum and cinema and citrus, its traditional exports, all
declined.
Pundits then forecast a regional
collapse. Yet, regardless, Los Angeles never collapsed, nor missed a
beat. The wartime immigrants stayed put here. They formed creative,
innovative small businesses in large numbers, giving L.A. its deserved
reputation for having the most dynamic, flexible, adaptable industrial base in
the nation. Besides exporting goods, L.A. also became more self-contained,
providing itself with more of the goods it previously imported. How could
this be?
1/8 of all new businesses started in the
U.S. were in L.A., 1945-50. These were small, creative, flexible, and too
varied to classify. No Linnaeus could sort them in conventional
categories: the new Angelenos simply stayed here and started producing
everything for themselves, some things previously imported, and others never
seen before. Eastern firms established branch plants here. Top
eastern students came to California's great university system, and stayed behind
to make careers and jobs here. There was a kind of regional "El Dorado
Effect," as demand and supply grew together, and growing local demand allowed
for economies of scale serving local markets. Food and shelter were cheap
and abundant. Land for business was accessible, providing a basis for the
whole self-contained phenomenon. A "continental tilt" developed in both
interest rates and wage rates, drawing in eastern capital and
labor.
Why is that not happening today, 1995? An
invisible, pervasive change is Proposition 13, which makes it possible to hold
land at negligible tax cost. In 1945 land was taxed at 3% every year,
building a fire under holdouts to turn their land to use. Today that same
tax cost is well below 1%. Using Gwartney's Rule of Thumb (see below under
B,1), it is about 1/8 of 1%: a rate of 1% applied to 1/8 of the true
value.
Landowners are only taxed now if they use
their land to hire people and produce something useful. Then they meet the
drag of our high business and employment and sales taxes, necessitated by the
fall of property taxes. A handful of oligopolistic landowners control most
of the market; small businesses are squeezed out. This helps us segue from
being at the cutting edge of industrial progress to a third-world economy - from
the NH model to the AL model - with little relief in sight.
What was different then? One obvious difference
was the high property tax dependence in 1945, and the lower burdens of sales
tax, business tax, and income tax. We not only had high property tax
rates, they were more focused on land then than now. California was more
hospitable to Georgist thinking than perhaps any other state then, shown by its
long run of Georgist political action in the prior thirty years. Several
states had "single-tax" movements and initiatives, 1910-14, but most of them
petered out. In California they continued through 1924, and then popped up
again in 1934-38. Even while "losing," such campaigns raised consciousness
of the issue to such a degree that assessors were focusing more attention on
land. Thus, in California, 1917, tax valuers focused on land value so much
that it constituted 72% of the assessment roll for property taxation - a much
higher fraction than today. This became the California tradition.
In 1934 the "EPIC" campaign of Upton
Sinclair included a strong Georgist element - he proposed to set up new
factories on idle land. Meantime, Jackson Ralston was pushing a purer land
tax initiative, 1934-38. Ralston lost, but the mere existence of such
political action in California, when the movement was torpid elsewhere, tells us
a lot. It reveals a large matrix of supportive voters and workers to whom
politicians (including tax assessors) would naturally respond by focusing on
land assessments.
California displayed amazing growth up to 1978,
and the resilience to shrug off the loss of war industries after 1945 and still
grow "explosively" (as Jane Jacobs put it). After 1978 we have a string of
reverses. The timing, along with a priori causative analysis, plus various
direct observations too numerous for this time-slot, support an hypothesis that
the reverses were aggravated by Prop. 13. Michigan, be warned of our lot,
and learn about taxes from us: "This Could Happen to You."
End of
quote.
The Lansing staff went home unmoved, and in 1995 Michigan, led by Governor
John Engler, took its schools off the property tax, putting them on
a State sales tax. The national media commented favorably,
crediting California?s pioneering Prop. 13. Soon, however, Michigan
got sicker.
The press of March 11, 2007 reported the
following:
* Michigan?s unemployment rate is at 7% and has
been for 4 years. Only Mississippi is higher; the national average is
4.6%. Some Michigan counties are at 10%. As old industries leave
they are not being replaced.
* Since June, 2000, Michigan has lost
300,000 jobs
* Personal income per capita dropped below the national
average in 2000 and has stayed below.
* 22,500 people aged 18-24 have
left since 2000. Michigan?s rate of outmigration ranks among the U.S.?s
highest.
* As everywhere, home foreclosures are up, sales and prices are
down, (Riverside, The Press-Enterprise, 3-11-07, page G-6)
Note again that first point, ?As old industries
leave they are not being replaced.? What is left behind then but idle land? Once
again, Detroit is riddled with holes, and in another of history?s ironies people
today are growing food in them to subsist ? ?Pingree?s Potato Patches? again,
105 years later.
Those are not the results you would expect from a
good tax system. Michigan leaders are behaving foolishly. To protect
homeowners, they shift taxes to business gross sales, and the result is loss of
jobs, with homes dumped on the market for a big loss. Displaced workers emigrate
with little cash, to start new lives at the bottom of the job ladder, and thank
you, Governor Engler!
None of Michigan?s postwar efforts at stimulative
tax reform, save one, have done the job. That one is Southfield 1960-1970, which
scholars and politicians have studiously ignored. Bellwether Detroit has lost
50% of its people, 1950-2000. Flint has lost 40%. Benton Harbor on Lake Michigan
is a basket case. Now, to top it off, today in 2008 Michigan has moved on from
mere decline to a Crash heard round the world. All the Big 3 face
bankruptcy and are begging Washington for bailouts just to keep Michigan?s
once-proud auto industry going at all.
Should Washington refuse to bail Michigan, perhaps
Michigan leaders will finally look in the mirror, foreswear their foolish ways,
and begin a new round of prosperity. Let us hope and pray, yes, but also furnish
our minds with the facts and analyses needed to do our job of pointing the way.
What could be more timely, and of more permanent value?