Why Georgists Correctly Predicted the Crisis

Mary Cleveland

[Reprinted from GroundSwell, 2009]

This essay, delivered during the February 27, 2009 session at the Eastern Economic Association meetings in New York City was originally posted in an email March 23, 2009 by Dr. Cleveland and is posted to the Association for Georgist Studies website. Dr. Cleveland organized the session, "Why Georgists Correctly Predicted the Crisis and Why (Almost) No One Took Them Seriously. What Conventional Economics Can Learn from Them--and Vice Versa." Panelists included Wellesley College Professor of Economics Karl E. (Chip) Case, Univ. of Calif.-Riverside Economics Professor Mason Gaffney, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations author David Warsh, Brendan (Dan) O?Flaherty of Columbia University, and Prof. Fred Foldvary of Santa Clara University.

Land bubbles of varying severity and universality recur roughly every eighteen to twenty years. Like Henry George, modern Georgists attribute recessions and depressions to collapse of these bubbles. A huge real estate bubble of the 1920's preceded the Depression of the 1930's. That bubble actually began to burst in 1926, three years before the stock market crash of 1929. So when "house values" exploded around the world during the last decade and then began to decline in 2006, many of us predicted the worst.

A few prominent economists recognized the bubble's threat, notably Karl Case and Robert Shiller of the Case-Shiller Home Price Index. But most economists didn't see the crisis coming until it ran them over. Why couldn't they see what Georgists saw? (Non-economists can skip to the last paragraph.)

1. Like Adam Smith and other classical economists, Georgists assume a three-factor world: land, labor and capital, earning economic rent, wages and interest respectively. But starting in the early 20th century, conventional economics merged land into capital. Land disappeared so completely that Robert Solow could joke in 1955 that "if God had meant there to be more than two factors of production, He would have made it easier for us to draw three dimensional diagrams."

2. Conventional economics airbrushes out economic rent. The National Income and Product Accounts omit or conceal rent. They exclude even realized capital gains, let alone unrealized gains. They lump rent received by business into profits. When I teach micro I have to explain to students that those cute little triangles we label "consumer surplus" and "producer surplus" are really economic rent.

3. Conventional microeconomics is static. Textbooks incorporate discounted present value poorly, or omit it altogether. In teaching micro, I've had to write a special section on discounting--after all, someday, students will buy houses and take out mortgages. Bubbles are just unrealistic projections of rent, capitalized into the present. Without discounting, how can we understand them? (Mind you, many Georgists don't understand discounting either; they explain bubbles as the work of "speculators." But at least they know bubbles are destructive.)

4. Conventional macroeconomics tosses out the good part of micro, namely, marginal analysis. So in conventional macro, all taxes are alike, all consumer spending is alike, all saving and investment is alike. Economists can truly believe that it's good for the economy now to borrow money (from whom?) and spend it on roads and bridges. How can they understand that overspending on infrastructure stimulates
bubbles?

5. Conventional economics disregards a central Georgist assumption: distribution of wealth matters. Moreover, the tax and subsidy system is rigged to drive rent to the top of the heap. This very rigging of the system also encourages bubbles. So the Georgist cure is to reverse
the rigging, capture the rent and redistribute it to society either in the form of public goods, or directly as tax credits or grants. That's a dangerously radical idea.

One hundred years ago, Georgists allied with Progressives to form a powerful movement for political and fiscal reform. In The Corruption of Economics,

Mason Gaffney argues that neoclassical economics assumed its blinkers precisely to thwart that movement--leaving modern economists helpless.