Who Killed Land Value Taxation in Ohio?
Will the Killer Strike Again Elsewhere?
William S. Peirce
[A presentation at the annual conference of the Council of Georgist
Organizations, held in Cleveland, Ohio, 6 August, 2009. William Peirce
is Professor Emeritus of Economics, Case Western Reserve University.
Reprinted from
GroundSwell, November-December 2009]
Editor's note: During a session August 6, 2009 at the
Council of Georgist Organizations conference in Cleveland, OH,
Professor Peirce made a presentation, Who Blocked LVT in Ohio, based
on this Lecture that was prepared for the Summer Fellowship Program
at AIER, 28 July 2009. A portion of this lecture on Allen Ripley
Foote has been edited out by your GroundSwell editor because of
space constraints. It may be published later.
Abstract
Economists who study the matter generally acknowledge that the Land
Value Tax (LVT) is superior to the real estate tax levied in most
municipalities. Nevertheless, the LVT is used in only a few locations
worldwide.
In early 20
th century Ohio the movement to adopt LVT was led by
strong and able politicians, yet the effort failed decisively.
Examination of this episode sheds some light on the factors that have
inhibited the adoption of LVT.
What is LVT
In this paper, "LVT" will be used to mean what some have
referred to as "LVT-lite." That is, LVT is the tax that
results from performing the following simple operation:
Take the Real Estate Tax of any municipal government, exempt
buildings and other improvements, raise the rate on land so that total
revenue is unchanged, and keep all of the other rules, regulations,
and institutions unchanged. A two-rate system is a partial move in the
direction of LVT in which the tax rate on buildings is lower than the
tax rate on land, but is above zero.
Most of the discussion by Cohen and Coughlin refers to LVT-lite.
(Cohen and Coughlin, "An Introduction to Two-Rate Taxation of
Land and Buildings", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
May/June 2005).
The full "Single Tax" is a more radical reform. As the name
suggests, it means eliminating all taxes on labor, capital,
transactions, and trade. Essentially the full quantity of land rents
would be taxed away. The passion Henry George displayed in Progress
and Poverty, and that many of his followers have exhibited since,
is directed toward the full Single Tax and the concomitant elimination
of all "Privilege", which a modern economist might refer to
as the "rents" or special favors that firms or individuals
seek from government.
The Single Tax is more interesting than the narrow technical change
of LVT, but it also poses greater problems, especially within a
Federal system where property taxes are not used to support the
national government.
While this study deals with LVT, much of the public discussion a
century ago was motivated by the Single Tax, and, indeed, the two were
much closer then because the bulk of government spending was state and
local at that time.
Cohen and Coughlin provide the standard mainstream economic
evaluation of LVT.
Because the supply of land is, for all practical purposes, totally
inelastic, a tax levied on the value of land produces no distortions
in the use of land and, hence, no excess burden. This is what
justifies Milton Friedman's remark that the LVT is "the least bad
tax."
The advantages of LVT can be explained without resorting to economic
jargon:
- Land cannot move away. Every other traditional tax tends
to drive away sales, income, or investment.
- Owners of vacant or poorly used land are pressured by every tax
bill to put their land into its highest and best use.
- Property owners who make improvements are not punished by
being hit with a higher tax bill.
- LVT encourages compact, high density development without
stifling regulation.
- LVT keeps the purchase price of land low, thus making access to
land easier for entrepreneurs and dampening the amplitude of the
real estate boom-bust cycle.
- LVT takes the burden off work and transactions.
- The incentive to improve property is universal and does not
require political intervention. Every property owner,
whether in the residential neighborhoods or the prominent downtown
locations, is rewarded instead of punished for improving his
property.
- If the shift to LVT could be made instantly, in most
communities the median tax bill for homes would decrease
slightly. Vacant land, parking lots, and poorly developed
commercial and industrial land would pay more.
- In the long run, all property owners benefit from the increased
economic development.
It is worth noting that the bloodless economic discussion of "excess
burden" distracts attention from the dynamics and excitement of
the market response to removing the distorting burden.
A front-page story in the Sunday Cleveland Plain Dealer (Jan.
11, 2004) provides an excellent example: the reluctance of owners of
prime downtown land to convert parking lots into the high rise
apartments that Cleveland needs if it is to develop a vibrant
downtown.
Unfortunately, the remedies suggested in the article are ineffectual,
expensive, and dictatorial. Ironically, Mayor (1901-1909) Tom L.
Johnson, whose statue presides over Public Square, could have
suggested the effective, market driven approach to solving the
problem.
As the article points out, landowners operate parking lots because
they can make more money doing that than they can building housing.
Meanwhile, developers eager to build housing say they cannot afford
the land. The remedies proposed include subsidies of various types and
using eminent domain to take the land from one owner and give it to
another more politically favored.
Yet the profitability of parking and the unprofitability of housing
are the result not just of market forces (What will you pay to park
downtown? What will you pay to rent or buy an apartment downtown?),
but also of tax policy. If vacant land (including parking lots) pays a
heavy enough real estate tax, people will not want to hold land
vacant. The fact that parking lots in downtown Cleveland have sold for
close to $4 million per acre indicates that owners are expecting
substantial net income even after paying real estate taxes, as well as
wages, insurance, and the other costs of operation. If the real estate
tax on vacant land were to be raised, the land would generate a
smaller net income and so the owner would be willing to sell the land
for a lower price.
The Ohio Constitution specifies that the real estate tax must be
levied at the same rate on land and buildings. Because of poor
assessing, however, in practice the developer faces a low tax on
vacant land and a higher tax if he builds a substantial building on
that same land. When Tom Johnson was mayor, the city worked very hard
to ensure that vacant and poorly developed land were assessed at full
market value. By shifting more of the burden to land, the burden on
buildings could be reduced. The state of Ohio a century ago did not
permit the Johnson administration to shift the tax burden entirely to
land and it would be at least as difficult politically today, but it
is clear that intelligent and determined tax administrators can move
toward that goal. It is a rare tax that provides revenue while
promoting economic development. The portion of the real estate tax
levied on land does that.
The Progressive Era in Ohio
The strongest and most sustained effort in the United States to
implement LVT and other ideas of Henry George occurred in Ohio during
the two decades prior to World War I.
The Historical Setting
Ohio at the beginning of the twentieth century was at the peak of its
relative political and industrial power. Taft was finishing his term
as President in 1912 as part of that string of eminent Ohio
politicians, including his predecessors Garfield and McKinley and his
successor (in 1920) Harding. The enormous private wealth that was
accumulating in Cleveland and other Ohio cities was, perhaps, more
impressive. Rockefeller's Standard Oil began with a refinery in his
hometown of Cleveland. The firms that ended up controlling most of the
iron ore of the Lake Superior district were headquartered in
Cleveland, and much of the ore moved on Cleveland-owned fleets to Lake
Erie ports. The coal mines of Appalachia were also pouring their rents
into Ohio cities.
The private wealth was not limited to accumulated natural resource
rents. The steel industry and the manufacture of machinery,
automobiles, appliances, and textiles were also important. Even in
these manufacturing industries, however, rent seeking, in the public
choice sense, played a role. The steel industry then, as now, turned
to Washington for trade restrictions in order to increase profits.
The rent seeking that attracted the most attention from the big city
mayors, however, was the quest for public utility franchises. The
street railway franchises, in particular, came to be symbols of the
battle against "privilege," which would today be described
in terms of rent seeking. The franchise was a grant to a private
company of the monopoly privilege of running streetcars on a
particular route. The franchise terms could specify fares that would
make the company very rich. Franchises of long duration posed a
special problem because costs in the street railway industry were
declining rapidly because of technological change. The usual approach
was alleged to be bribing the city council to agree to a very
profitable franchise. In the rare cases where the mayor and council
resisted, the company would, it was believed, bribe the legislature to
award the franchise anyway. Similar facts were alleged for other
public utilities, but the streetcar was a more potent political symbol
because the streetcar lines gave freedom of location to the common
man. No longer did the laborer have to live in a filthy, crowded,
unhealthy slum beside the mill. If he could afford to take a
streetcar, he and his family could enjoy the blessings of urban sprawl
(Howe,
City, 203-205).
This situation provides the backdrop for four extraordinary mayors
who made their reputations battling "privilege" in Cleveland
and Toledo. (The most convenient source is Bremner.) All four were
successful enough outside politics so that they could afford to be
independent. Tom Johnson had made his fortune in business before being
elected Mayor of Cleveland in 1901. He started poor and made his first
fortune in streetcar lines, both through invention, hard work, and
skillful management and through the usual financial manipulations.
(These were variations on the capitalization of monopoly profits and
franchise rents.) He then made additional fortunes in the steel
industry, establishing Cambria Steel at Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and
the Lorain, Ohio, mill that subsequently became part of U.S. Steel. By
1901, however, he had sold his businesses and retired to his palatial
home on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland. He had been greatly influenced by
the writings of Henry George and converted to the virtues of the
single tax and free trade. Johnson used the battle against the
streetcar franchises and for the 3 cent fare as the central theme is
his campaigns, but his goal was that Cleveland should be "the
city on the hill"-a place of pride and comfort for its residents,
rather than a squalid industrial slum. Johnson lost the election in
1909 and died in 1911.
Newton D. Baker, one of the young men in Johnson's administration,
was elected mayor in 1912. Baker was elected for a second term, but
declined to run for a third in 1916. He then became Secretary of War
until 1920, after which he made his fortune as a lawyer (Cramer).
While not as colorful as Johnson, Baker was an extremely able attorney
and shared Johnson's view that the city must be free to solve its own
problems. Baker and Brand Whitlock (of whom more below) were the
principal drafters of the municipal home rule that was adopted in
large measure by the 1912 convention (Baker, xv) and also addressed
the convention in support of it (105, 119).
Samuel Jones became mayor of Toledo in 1897, even before Tom Johnson
returned to Cleveland. Jones, born in poverty, had worked his way up
in the oil business and was an owner of the Ohio Oil Company, which
was sold to Standard Oil. In 1892 he moved to Toledo and established
the Acme Sucker Rod Company. His eccentrically humane management
style, including high wages, citing the Golden Rule as the only
company policy, and sponsoring a forum every Sunday afternoon at which
reformers and radicals and others spoke and the crowd sang songs
written by Jones seems to have been a very profitable formula for
business. Through a set of accidents he was elected mayor in 1897 as a
Republican and as an independent twice more after the Republicans
abandoned him (Bremner, 23-33; Whitlock, Forty, 112-152; Howe,
Confessions, 184-188). The humane style soon caused political
problems for Jones and eventually the state legislature passed a
special law to take control of the Toledo police department. Although
Brand Whitlock, then working for Jones, was able to find a legal
technicality to have the action overthrown, the episode contributed to
the impression that the rural legislators did not understand big
cities and their immigrant populations.
After Jones died in 1904, Whitlock ran in 1905 and served as mayor
until 1912. Like Baker, Whitlock was an able attorney succeeding an
extraordinary amateur politician. Whitlock, however, considered
himself primarily a writer and continued to publish short stories and
articles and work on novels while in office. Whitlock had a deep
distrust of the criminal law as a result of his years as a reporter in
Chicago and his work as a criminal defense lawyer. He continued the
libertarian policing policies that Jones had adopted, arousing the
same political opposition. After Woodrow Wilson's election Whitlock
used his political contacts to have himself appointed the chief U.S.
diplomat in Brussels. This would have been a sinecure had not World
War I intervened.
The main issues for the mayors, however, were not issues of
personality and style, but rather the situations leading to rampant
rent seeking combined with the lack of local control. Baker suggested
that some of the rural antipathy toward the cities was provoked by the
rural depression that was, in turn, caused by the policy of
maintaining high tariffs on manufactured goods (Baker, xiv). Thus, the
rent seekers, or to use the term of the day "privilege" lay
behind most of the difficulties faced by the cities. yes">
Although some interpreted the attack on privilege as a socialist
attack on profits and the creation of wealth, the more perceptive
progressives understood the difference:
"An examination of the conditions in city after city
discloses one sleepless influence that is common to them all.
Underneath the surface phenomena the activity of privilege appears,
the privileges of the street railways, the gas, the water, the
telephone, and electric-lighting companies. The connection of these
industries with politics explains most of the corruption; it
explains the power of the boss and the machine; it suggests the
explanation of the indifference of the "best" citizen and
his hostility to democratic reform. Moreover, it throws much light
on the excellence of some departments of city life and the
inefficiency of others, for the interest of the franchise
corporations is centered in the council, in the executive
departments, and in the tax-assessors. It does not extend to the
schools, libraries, parks, and fire departments, departments which
are free from the worst forms of corruption. But the city council
awards franchises. It fixes the terms and regulations under which
the franchise corporations may use the streets. The executive enjoys
the veto power. He controls permits, and exercises an influence upon
the council and public opinion. The assessor determines the
appraisal of property as well as the taxes to be paid."
(Frederic C. Howe, The City The Hope of Democracy, p.63.)
"For wealth without privilege does not organize to
control parties, primaries, or conventions. The retail dealer,
wholesale dealer, or manufacturer is not found in the council
chamber." (op.cit., 73-74)
The Constitutional Convention
Although it was clear that a lot of people were interested in
changing the Ohio constitution, it was not obvious that they had much
in common. The liquor question was frothing up and some women kept
demanding the vote. (Various German-American groups, however, kept
insisting that they wanted to drink and did not want women to vote.)
Herbert Bigelow, ardent single taxer and advocate of liberal causes
from the pulpit of the Vine Street Church in Cincinnati took on the
task of organizing first the call for the convention and then the
election of the appropriate delegates. (The details of the maneuvering
are recounted by Beaver [pp. 19-25].)
When the Ohio Constitutional Convention opened in 1912 Progressives
could look forward to drafting the constitutional amendments that they
had long advocated. Ratification by the voters might be a problem, but
at least the convention should have been in their pocket. Much of the
campaign to call the convention had been led by Herbert Seely Bigelow,
the politically inclined pastor of the Vine Street Church in
Cincinnati. He had worked throughout the election campaign for
delegates to the convention to support the most progressive candidates
and especially those pledged to "direct democracy," i.e.,
the constitutional provisions that would allow voters, by petition, to
initiate legislation, to require referenda on issues passed by the
legislature, to initiate referenda to amend the state constitution,
and to initiate elections to recall public officials including judges.
(Most of the discussion of direct democracy focuses on the Initiative
and Referendum, which will be denoted as I&R, unless
differentiation is necessary.)
The I&R was considered crucial to wrest control of the state away
from the political bosses and lobbyists who were alleged to buy any
laws they wanted from the ruffians elected by the people to represent
them.
Progressives generally celebrated the results of the Convention. Not
only did the I&R pass, the Convention sent a total of forty-two
items to the electorate for ratification. The one that seemed most
important to the mayors of the large cities, who had also ardently
supported calling the convention, was municipal home rule. Several
items on the progressive agenda passed the convention, but were
rejected by the voters, including the abolition of capital punishment,
limitations on the use of the injunction in disputes, women's
suffrage, omitting "white" from criteria for voting,
allowing women to hold public offices specifically dealing with women,
and allowing the legislature to restrict billboards on private
property near public roads. Voters did approve 33 of the 41 measures
(the 42
nd was to vote "yes" or "no" on
licensing the liquor traffic -- "yes" won). These included
such items as the 8-hour day for public employees, a workmen's
compensation system, allowing the legislature to regulate wages and
hours, reforestation to provide animal habitat and control flooding,
and abolition of contracting of prison labor.
Although the progressives achieved, in the convention at least, much
of what they sought, they left the cities of Ohio encumbered by a
disastrous property tax system. One of the offending clauses from the
1912 convention remains as Section 1e of Article II of the current
Constitution of Ohio:
"The powers defined herein as the 'initiative' and
'referendum' shall not be used to pass a law authorizing any
classification of property for the purpose of levying different
rates of taxation thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single
tax on land or land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a
different rule than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or
to personal property."
The other was passed as Section 2 of Article XII. It has since been
amended, but in its 1912 form it stated:
"Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule,
all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock
companies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal property
according to its true value in money, excepting... [existing state
and local bonds, exempt public and charitable, etc. property] ...and
personal property, to an amount not exceeding in value five hundred
dollars, for each individual, may, by general laws, be exempted from
taxation..."
The municipalities narrowly escaped having a 1 percent tax limit
fixed in the constitution, as well. The amendment went on to permit
the legislature to levy uniform or graduated taxes on estates or
inheritances and on incomes. In addition, the legislature was
authorized to pass excise and franchise taxes and "taxes upon the
production of coal, oil, gas and other minerals" (1881-1882). The
estate and income taxes were part of the progressive agenda, but they
were controlled by the state, with not less than half returned to the
municipality of residence of the taxpayer.
The focus here will be on the form and restrictions of the property
tax, which remained the principal revenue source for local
governments. How did it happen that the convention that was supposed
to set the people and the cities free ended up by prohibiting the
single tax and binding the cities to a totally unworkable concept of "uniform"
taxation?
The Single Tax
Bigelow's known single tax proclivities (e.g., Bigelow, 1916)
constituted a point on which the whole progressive agenda could be
open to attack. Single taxers were rare in Ohio, but included the
group that had worked with Tom Johnson, including Newton D. Baker, and
also Brand Whitlock. Nevertheless, the only admitted single taxer at
the convention other than Herbert Bigelow was Edward W. Doty of
Cleveland, a master parliamentarian who wrote the rules and dominated
the process of the convention through sheer force of intellect, but
couldn't quite salvage the taxation proposal (1650-1675). In view of
the lack of support within the convention or among the voters for the
single tax, it seems surprising, at first glance, that it became an
issue.
One factor that led to the focus on the single tax was the fact that
Bigelow, in his long and extensive campaign for the convention and the
I&R had been supported by the Joseph Fels Commission Fund, which
was established by the prominent soap manufacturer to promote the
single tax. To make matters worse, opponents of I&R;began to cite
this and similar remarks made at single tax conferences: "We have
cleared the way for a straight single-tax fight in Oregon. All the
work we have done for direct legislation has been done with the single
tax in view, but we have not talked single tax because that was not
the question before the house."
Remarks attributed to W.S. U'Ren in a report to a single-tax
conference in New York, November 19-20, 1910 (708).
The other factor is a little less transparent. A well known business
lobbyist named Allen Ripley Foote wrote a pamphlet against the I&R
published by the Ohio Board of Commerce. This was widely circulated
and played on the alleged connection between I&R and the single
tax. If it was intended to persuade farmers to vote against the I&R
it might well have been successful, for farmers find it hard to
believe that a tax on land value will not crush farmers. As usual,
Brand Whitlock phrased the point more elegantly: "Johnson was a
single taxer, supposed in Ohio to be a method of taxation whereby
everybody would be relieved of taxation except the farmers who would
be taxed according to the superficial area of their farms... The
proposal for tax reform still waits, and will wait, I fancy for years,
since it is so fundamental, and mankind never attacks fundamental
problems until it has exhausted all the superficial ones."
(Whitlock,
Forty, 169).
Yet if the industrialists and utilities supporting Foote really
believed that the single tax would be borne by farmers, surely they
would have endorsed it. It seems, therefore, that the objective was to
defeat the I&R and that they knew that the single tax was
irrelevant, except to scare people. This leads to the question of why
the delegates behaved as they did, however. The convention suffered
through numerous lengthy speeches about the joys of homes and farms as
an explanation for why the single tax had to be locked out so that it
could never destroy Ohio.
Samples of the debate
Cunningham:
"The other half of the voters, made up of the slums
of our cities, single taxers, socialists and dynamiters...will vote
for it" (688).
Halfhill:
"Rich men, whose property is personal, are joining
hands with socialism to throw all the burdens of government upon the
soil and take from private owners all title to their income from
land." (696).
Lampson:
"I'll stand here and defend the homeowners and the
farmers of the state of Ohio against this monstrous single tax being
put upon them until my tongue is palsied and clings to the roof of
my mouth, if it be necessary." (713).
It took several hundred pages to palsy every tongue.
Uniformity or Classification
At first glance uniformity may seem like neutrality, and hence a good
thing in the usual analysis of public finance. Before leaping to that
conclusion, however, it is important to stop and consider the tax base
to which uniform rates were to be applied. As noted above, the base
consisted of "all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks,
joint stock companies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal
property according to its true value in money." Delegates noted
various objections to this tax base. One problem is that the
intangible property was rarely declared and hard for the tax collector
to find. Another problem is that financial transactions such as
mortgages and debts bloat the measure of property. Some delegates
spoke of netting out debts, thus turning this property tax into a true
wealth tax. Other delegates pointed out that when you try to tax
wealth, the wealthy move away and take their wealth with them. In the
end, however, the base remained intact. Legend has it that the tax on
intangibles was one of the main reasons why John D. Rockefeller moved
away from Cleveland. Although this part of the constitution has been
amended again, vestiges of the tax on intangibles remained on the
books into the 1970s. Even more troublesome is the remaining vestige
of the personal property tax, which still exists in the form of a tax
on business inventories and equipment.
Classification; i.e., setting different rates for different classes
of property could have mitigated the damages, but every effort to pass
it failed. One reason was the fear of what the legislature would do
under the influence of the lobbyists. Ironically, the single tax fear
instilled by Allen Ripley Foote probably sounded the death knell for
classification, a device by which the single tax might creep in. Yet
business could have made a strong case to the legislature for a low
rate on machinery. Of course the farmers always felt that their land
and buildings were more likely to be found by the tax collector than
stocks and bonds and so a lower rate on intangibles would be a double
injustice.
The Attack on the Progressive Agenda
The careful reader of Bremner's book,
George and Ohio's Civic Revival, or of Hoyt Landon Warner's
Progressivism in Ohio, 1897-1917 learns that Allen Ripley
Foote was the arch enemy of progressives in Ohio, the master lobbyist
for the forces of "Privilege." Reading contemporary sources
strengthens that impression. Tom Johnson, the progressive mayor of
Cleveland from 1901-1909, singled out Foote as one of his wiliest
opponents, and Louis Post, editor of the progressive weekly The
Public, described Foote as a tool of the special interests.
A modern economist, however, is most likely to stumble across the
name of Allen Ripley Foote in the list of highly distinguished
economists who have served as presidents of the National Tax
Association. Indeed, Foote was a founding member of that professional
association and served as president from 1907 to 1913. Ajay Mehrotra,
in his dissertation on the NTA, describes Foote as a man "
with
decades of experience with reform movements
[who]
set out
to create an organization dedicated to making the fiscal machinery of
government more effective and efficient." Similarly, the entry on
Foote in Ohio History Central.org, the online encyclopedia of the Ohio
Historical Society, states, "Like many other reformers during the
Progressive Era, Foote opposed monopolies and firmly believed that the
federal government and state governments should encourage competition
among businesses." In the era of muckrakers and trustbusters, a
devotion to encouraging competition would also place Foote among the
progressives.
Who was Foote? Was he the dedicated reformer, founder of the
association that tried to make a profession of the study and
implementation of taxation, contributor to debates on public policy,
spokesman for competition and improved transparency of corporate
reporting through uniform accounting standards? Or was he a tool of
the special interests who tried to torpedo every progressive reform to
protect Privilege? Whatever the judgment of his ideology or motives,
however, Foote certainly earned a place in a History of Economics
session through the volume of his writing, his historical importance
in the development of public policy, and his role as a founder of the
NTA.
Who Killed LVT?
The smoking gun is clearly in the hand of Foote, but he had plenty of
accomplices. Seligman, the intellectual and academic leader of the
NTA, orchestrated opposition to the Single Tax. He did strongly
advocate separation of tax sources for different levels of government,
which would have allowed the use of LVT-lite to support local
government. Foote's efforts in Ohio were financed by a subset of large
firms that did not include the major manufacturers, although it is not
clear to me that railroads and electric utilities would pay more under
LVT than under an ordinary real estate tax. Of course, the owners of
large amounts of undeveloped land can always be rallied to oppose LVT.
The farmers, also, lived in fear of the Single Tax, although it is
hard to prove that most active farmers would be disadvantaged by an
LVT as a replacement for local property taxes, except, perhaps, in
counties that shifting from agriculture to residential.
To a considerable degree the demise of LVT in Ohio can be attributed
to self-inflicted wounds by its own supporters. The more extreme
rhetoric of the Single Tax branded the moderate reform of the LVT,
which was the only change that could be made at the state level. The
maneuvering of the Fels Commission regarding I&R as a step toward
LVT added to the feeling that it was all a plot to do something
harmful. Herbert Bigelow, despite his energy and dedication, was a
petulant and inept political leader. Once Tom Johnson died, LVT had no
leader who combined intelligence, political skill, and extreme
dedication to the cause.
Will the Killer Strike again elsewhere?
Followers of Henry George are still split over the question of
accepting the LVT-lite Compromise or pushing for the whole Single Tax.
The Single Tax is a national issue, and the associated rhetoric makes
sale of the LVT more difficult at the local level. In many areas
farmers are no longer a political force, but in agricultural areas the
advent of highly capital intensive "factory farms" has
intensified the opposition of the more land-intensive traditional
farmers to LVT. On the favorable side, the hollowing out of the cities
-- large and small -- across America provides an opening for any
policy that promises to redevelop the urban wastelands. LVT will not,
however, be supported by the major developers because they cut their
own individual tax exemption deals with the politicians and have no
interest in providing that advantage to every property owner in the
city.
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